Brexit is not only a historical chapter of the British -EU relationship, but it also carries immense challenges for fi nancial market stability in the short and medium run for the 28 member states of the European Union. The scale of these challenges depends heavily on the outcome of EU-UK negotiations. The European Systemic Risk Board plays a critical role in macroprudential supervision, a crucial policy challenge for the EU. However, there are doubts as to whether it will fulfi ll its mandate. The EU27 faces major problems in terms of prudential supervision after Brexit since a very large part of their wholesale banking markets are in the UK and thus will not be regulated by the EU after 29 March 2019. Indications point to a considerable risk of a new transatlantic banking crisis in the future.
A 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom resulted in a narrow majority in favor of what is referred to as Brexit: the departure of the UK from the European Union on 29 March 2019, after 45 years of EU membership. It is already clear, and has been emphasised at the 2018 meeting of British Prime Minister Theresa May and US President Donald Trump in Davos, that the UK and the US are working towards a British-American transatlantic trade and investment partnership agreement that is expected to help the UK to overcome the dampening effects of Brexit on long-term economic growth.
After reaching an agreement on the transitional period for Brexit in March 2018 that confi rmed the UK's continued activity in the EU single market until 2020, negotiations headed into a fi nal stage in which future EU-UK trade relations should be framed within a sectoral free trade agreement. EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier emphasised that fi nancial services will largely be left out of the free trade agreement.
1 Thus, the UK will encounter a considerable disadvantage as it has been running a sectoral current account surplus in fi nancial services vis-à-vis the EU27 that has partly offset its high structural current account defi cit in goods with the EU for many years. For the EU27, Brexit will create a particular problem due to the fact that 90% of the EU27's wholesale banking market is located in the City of London. London's fi nancial district is strong in derivatives -designed as a hedging instrument against certain risks -as well as in foreign exchange trading of US dollar and euro contracts and the arrangement of big loans for EU27 multinational companies. After Brexit, the majority of the EU banking wholesale market, as well as many insurance contracts for EU27 countries, will be based outside of the Community. And this means that EU legislation will only apply (with certain exceptions) until the end of the transition period, 31 December 2020. While the Brexit-related analysis of many authors has focused on trade issues, 2 the fi nancial market perspective • London banks will relocate to EU countries for certain activities; but some banks -particularly, major US banking subsidiaries in the UK -will relocate activities to New York, which is considered the next best location for the provision of fi nancial services with economies of scale.
3 Bank for International Settlements: 87th Annual Report, 2016/17, Basel 2017. 4 A. C e s a -B i a n c h i , F.E. M a r t i n , G. T h w a i t e s : Foreign booms, • Even if there is relocation to EU countries, one may assume that more than half of the EU wholesale banking markets -comprising derivatives, loans to big EU clients and foreign exchange market activities denominated in euro -will remain in the UK even after Brexit. Estimates show that in 2016, about 90% of the EU wholesale markets were located in the UK and around one-third of these could go to the EU due to Brexit.
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Current EU banking and consumer protection laws will no longer apply post-Brexit unless a special chapter in the new treaties imposes minimum cooperation requirements between the UK and the EU. This includes British macroprudential institutions (the Bank of England) as well as UK prudential supervisory institutions in banking, insurance and securities markets, and the relevant institutions in the eurozone and the EU, particularly the European Central Bank, which supervises around 120 large banks in the eurozone, and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is responsible for macroprudential supervision in the EU. The ECB as a European Institution is a full member of the ESRB. 8 Only Norway and Iceland are observers.
The cost of Brexit could become much larger than studies suggest due to the lack of cooperation in macroprudential supervision and economic policy between the soon to be post-Brexit UK and the EU27. It is also important to take into account the size of foreign direct investment impediments in OECD countries in banking and insurance and in fi nances in order to get a better idea about the effects of the relocation of capital fl ows in the context of Brexit. The UK government is likely to consider changes in the corporate tax rate and in banking regulation as a means of raising the growth rate of output above the reduced level observed in the context of Brexit.
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The ECB CISS indicator (see Figure 1) shows that the UK referendum has raised fi nancial market nervousness and a new spike could occur in 2018-19 as it becomes clear whether or not Brexit -and what type of Brexit (hard or soft) -will be implemented. The Bank of England could fi ght a recession with an expansionary monetary policy to some degree, but then the infl ation rate would rise again in the context of a strong pound depreciation.
Brexit
Brexit poses a number of problems to contract continuity:
• Two trillion GBP in derivative contracts could become void on 29 March 2019. This applies to insurance contracts as well: 30 million EU policyholders and six million UK insurance policyholders could face serious problems unless a timely solution is negotiated.
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Financial service providers have also pointed out the relevance of contract continuity problems. 11 The envisaged transition period -until the end of 2020 -could help to mitigate some of the problems associated with derivative contracts, but insurance policies are different because most are long term.
• If a solution is not found, the result could be heightened fi nancial instability in both British and European markets.
It is hard to believe that these issues have not yet been resolved as of the fi rst quarter of 2018. Failure to achieve a timely solution indicates that there is a deep political rift between the UK and the EU. All current Brexit cost estimates would be too low if the contract continuity problem continues.
Brexit, EU-UK trade agreement and fi nancial market instability
Depending on the outcome of Brexit negotiationswhether the result is "hard," i.e. leaving the EU single mar- 
Brexit
To the extent that leading banks from London will relocate to EU27 countries, the respective host countries can be expected to improve their product innovations in banking and fi nancial services. EU regulations may put pressure on leading investment funds from the UK, pushing them to relocate certain activities to EU27 countries. The ESMA has put some pressure on British investment funds to consider such relocation. London banks looking to relocate to Ireland and continental EU countries do not have much lead time for this relocation. Banks intending to operate in one of the 19 European countries starting in April 2019 must submit a request for a license at the ECB. Ireland, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have a location advantage. It appears that the Dutch government is not eager to attract additional fi nancial sector activities from the UK because small open economies may incur additional stability risks in the future due to a strong relative increase in the banking and fi nance sector.
As long as the EU and the UK cannot fi nd a compromise on a fi nancial service free trade agreement, the banks in the UK face a diffi cult transition period. Future interactions would be based on "regulatory equivalence arrangements" -or the EU's limited and revocable access given to third country institutions in a particular fi eld of fi nancial services. The EU already has such agreements with the US and Singapore; banks in the UK will likely face similar regulatory arrangements. However, this is based on the premise that fi nancial service regulation in the UK would be recognised as the equivalent to respective EU regulation. The British government is eager to adopt a new wave of deregulation -partly fueled by inherent pressure to follow the Trump administration's deregulation initiatives. The EU, however, is hesitant to accord broad equivalence agreements.
EU28 banks will be strongly affected by further steps toward Brexit. This should be refl ected in the EU's Brexitrelated stress test on the biggest EU28 banks in November 2018. The test includes new IFRS9 requirements, e.g., provisions for the anticipated future losses of asset positions.
14 A key problem with the EBA stress test is that November 2018 is much too late. The EBA-sponsored banking stress test is scheduled to be published in November 2018 and will do very little to reinforce confi dence. The IFRS9 accounting standard should not be included for the fi rst time if it casts doubt on the stress test.
14 IFRS9 means that banks should avoid traditional problems, for example those visible in the Transatlantic Banking Crisis which meant that provisions could only be made for losses when they had been realized even though bank managers could clearly anticipate the respective losses.
The overall institutional setting for prudential supervision and macroprudential supervision presents a rather complex picture, which includes global international organisations such as the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as well as EU institutions (ESRB, EBA, EIOPA, ESMA) and national agencies.
Risks for EU28 banking and fi nancial market stability
With the UK's exit from the European Union, the question of banking stability in the EU will again come to the fore. The fi nancial activities in London are, from an EU perspective, of a much greater dimension than the activities of the British bank HSBC.
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The Bank of England may, according to suggestions from the British government and indications from Brexit-related legislation, take a different regulatory path than that of the EU by orienting itself toward deregulation. Similar calls were made by the British banking sector in consultation with the May government. 16 It appears, therefore, that the UK will follow the deregulation program suggested by the Trump administration in March 2018.
Three particular transitory risks related to relocation should be noted:
• If the relocation of activity X initially based in London to eurozone country E i ( i =1, 2…19) takes place, one might face the problem in country i that the national supervisory authority lacks the expertise required leading to new transitory policy risks.
• Relocation could raise the costs of the provision of the respective fi nancial service, at the same time there could be opportunities for innovation due to spillover effects, i.e. EU27 host cities/regions could benefi t from the diffusion of these advantages.
• The relocation of London bank activities to the EU27 could bring about political tensions between the EU and the UK.
The risk of spillovers in terms of banking deregulation being transferred unintentionally from the UK to the EU27 should be more thoroughly analysed. There are certainly Brexit options for EU-UK regulatory cooperation. However, if Brexit brings a strong long-run output decline, thereby putting pressure on the British government to adopt reduced corporate tax rates and lighter fi nancial regulation in the UK, the EU27 will not have much interest in regulatory cooperation. Research needs to be conducted to analyse how big the "forced" FDI relocation towards the EU27 in the banking and insurance sector will be and to assess the current account and nominal plus real exchange rate effects on the UK and the EU27, respectively.
The updated IMF FSAP reports for the UK and the eurozone in 2018 cannot replace the necessary cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board. If macroprudential analysis in the ESRB in 2017-18 is restricted and does not deliver a comprehensive analysis for the EU28 countries, the cost of Brexit could be much higher than expected since the analytical gaps imply a lack of risk management from the policymakers' side.
Incomplete risk management analysis
The EU28 countries should also take a critical look at financial markets and banking with regards to broader risk management perspectives. Is this happening as part of a rational international transition process in the Brexit dynamics in 2017/2018? No. The Bank of England apparently was partially blocking adequate analysis at the ESRB in which case Brexit could become a blind fl ight.
The type of supervision the ESRB is supposed to guarantee requires an understanding of the potential systemic risk that emerges from the interaction of individual banks in stress; shocks in foreign exchange markets, real estate markets or natural resources markets; shocks associated with fi scal or monetary policy; or political risks. 17 In 2017, the Governor of the Bank of England -who is also First Vice-Chair of the ESRB -did not actively support the ESRB task to broadly analyse the relevant Brexit dynamics that could be highly relevant for systemic stability of the EU28 within a joint analytical effort. The ESRB's risk dashboard results from March 2018 indicate some fi nancial market links between EU27 countries and the UK. Regarding the strong UK fi nancial market links to so many EU countries, the data for the UK is not available and, therefore, is not included on the risk map in Figure 2 .
The Bank of England and other UK authorities have all the relevant data, and it seems obvious that the UK is being uncooperative in terms of risk analysis by the ESRB and thus is undermining the ability of the ESRB to fulfi ll its 17 Political risk has become a broader challenge in the OECD countries as emphasised by the BIS Annual Report of 2015.
mandate. This already started happening two years before the UK departure date, at least according to the timeline of the May government. Will the European Parliament and the EU accept such non-cooperation from the UK in an EU28 institution? What are the conclusions about EU-UK cooperation to be included more or less strictly in the EU-UK treaties on Brexit? A free ride regulatory policy option for the UK would be quite inadequate both from an EU27 perspective and a global perspective.
In the context of Brexit, the ESRB will not look into the relevant macroprudential aspects of the EU28's banking system and its interactions. The historic nature of Brexit reduces the EU's economic weight by almost one-fi fth.
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The departure of EU27's wholesale banking market center -located in London -will likely temporarily strain the fi nancial market. This clearly requires an integrated EU28 analysis rather than a separate picture of the UK and the 18 Based on gross domestic product data of 2016. eurozone as painted by the Bank of England and the ECB, respectively. In 2017, the ESRB apparently was either unwilling or unable to deliver this; and the role of the Bank of England is opaque.
As we have discussed previously, fi nancial market risks in the Brexit transition process could be reduced if macroprudential analysis is adequate at the ESRB and if all policy actors in the EU28 assume their respective responsibilities. The challenges could, however, be considerable if rising US interest rates plus political instability and policy inconsistencies overlap in Brexit. Post-Brexit, the UK may only be an observer at the ESRB if an eventual EU-UK treaty makes arrangements which allow for such a status.
Leaving the EU puts a broader responsibility on the UK than simply considering narrowly defi ned national interests. It should be clear that before any EU-UK Free Trade Agreement can be negotiated, the EU27 must make sure that there is an agreement in the fi eld of joint prudential supervision and cooperation for the years 2018-2020. It can be shown that there is a trilemma in the case of fl exible exchange rates, namely that it is impossible to have both fl exible exchange rates, free capital fl ows and adequate banking regulation.
19 Considerable fi nancial market volatility in Europe and in the US -due to EU28 spillover effects and Trump's trade war policy effects -should be expected in 2018-2020 and high volatility could undermine prospects for stable economic growth in OECD countries.
The May government will face the option of pursuing a hard Brexit -which could result in a very serious Northern Ireland border regime problem or possibly even a new Scottish referendum -or accept a customs union solution, the latter seeming most likely. There is no doubt that political stability will be at a premium in the UK.
